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Comment
Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company v. Clarke:
A Second Look at National Bank Annuity Sales
and 12 U.S.C. § 92
Jonathan B. Cleveland
Commercial banks stand to earn billions of dollars in an-
nual fee income' from selling annuity contracts.2 Although his-
torically the sale of annuities has been the almost exclusive
domain of insurance companies, the Office of Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC)3 recently opined that national banks may sell
fixed and variable annuity contracts in their branches through a
brokerage subsidiary.4 Not surprisingly, the insurance industry
opposes commercial banks entering their once-protected market.
An insurance company challenged the OCC opinion, claiming
1. See Supreme Court Is Next Stop in Legal Dispute Over Bank Annuities,
BANKING PoLIcY REPORT, Sept. 20, 1993, at 7, 7 (stating that "billions of dollars
in future business are at stake in the wake of a federal appeals court decision
holding that national banks may not sell annuities"). In 1992, annuities gener-
ated $450 million in fee income for banks. Karen Talley, Courts Leave Banks in
Limbo on Right to Market Annuities, Axs. BANKER, Sept. 28, 1993, at 12, 12; see
Arthur D. Postal, Annuity Case Gets Push Toward Supreme Court, FDIC
WATCH, Jan. 24, 1994, at 1, 1 (noting that "annuities accounted for 7% of all
bank brokerage sales activities in 1992"). During the first half of 1993, banks
recorded their highest volume of annuity sales and expected strong future
growth. Kalen Holliday, Banks Benefit from Stampede to Insurance Products,
Am. BANKER, Sept. 24, 1993, at 13, 13.
2. An annuity contract creates an obligation to periodically pay a stated
sum to a stated recipient for either a pre-determined fixed term, or for the life of
the annuitant. See 1 JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LA-w
AND PRACTICE § 81 (1988).
3. The OCC is the administrator of national banks. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 21,
24(7), 92a(a)-(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1993); infra note 12 and accompanying text
(discussing OCC responsibilities).
4. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 331, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,501 (Apr. 4, 1985) (approving sale of variable an-
nuity contracts); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 499, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) S 83,090 (Feb. 12, 1990) (approving sale of fixed
annuity contracts). A national bank must obtain approval from the OCC to en-
gage in an activity not expressly described by statute. See infra note 12; see
also infra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing OCC opinion permitting
national banks to sell annuities).
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that annuities are insurance, and that 12 U.S.C. § 925 prohibits
national banks from selling insurance in cities with more than
5000 persons.6
A district court upheld the OCC opinion 7, but the Fifth Cir-
cuit overruled the OCC in Variable Annuity Life Insurance Com-
pany v. Clarke (VALIC).8 VALIC not only eliminates a potential
billion-dollar source of fee income for national banks from the
sale of annuities, but also sharply restricts national bank insur-
ance powers. The Fifth Circuit interpreted § 92 broadly to pro-
hibit national banks from brokering virtually any insurance
company product or engaging in any insurance related activity.9
5. Section 92 provides that "any such [national bank] located and doing
business in any place the population of which does not exceed five thousand
inhabitants ... may, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by
the Comptroller of the Currency, act as the agent for any fire, life or other in-
surance company ... by soliciting and selling insurance and collecting premi-
ums on policies issued by such company." 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1988) (omitted since
1952). The United States Code has omitted § 92 since 1952 with a note indicat-
ing that Congress repealed it by the Act of April 5, 1918. See United States
Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., 113 S. Ct. 2173, 2176 (1993).
The Supreme Court held that Congress did not repeal § 92. Id. at 2176-77.
The circuits disagree over the substantive meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 92. The
Second and Fifth Circuits contend that § 92 creates a prohibition on national
bank insurance activities in cities with more than 5000 persons. See American
Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2959 (1993); Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc. 399 F.2d
1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1968). The Eighth and D.C. Circuits contend that § 92
imposes no limitation on national bank insurance activities. See Independent
Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 736 F.2d
468, 476-77 (8th Cir. 1984); Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613
F.2d 1164, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980); infra note
147.
6. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1295, 1297 (5th Cir.
1993).
7. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 786 F.Supp. 639, 642
(S.D.Tex. 1991), rev'd, 998 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1993).
8. 998 F.2d at 1296. The Fifth Circuit recently denied a petition by the
OCC for review of the ruling en banc. Valic Rehearing Rejected in 5th Circuit,
BAdNG ATY, Jan. 24, 1994, at 3. Although the OCC was undoubtedly disap-
pointed by the ruling, the decision seems to provide an "engraved invitation to
the Comptroller and the banking industry to ask the Supreme Court to review
[VALICi." Id. The Fifth Circuit rejected the OCC's petition for review because
only four of the seven judges necessary voted in favor of rehearing the case. Id.
Notably, six judges recused, leaving more judges in favor of rehearing than
against. Id. Furthermore, the four judges favoring a rehearing issued a sting-
ing statement objecting to the VALIC decision. See Postal, supra note 1,. at 1.
Judge Jerry E. Smith, voting in favor of a rehearing, stated that VALIC repre-
sents of view of § 92 that is "contrary to the well settled interpretation that has
prevailed." Id. (quoting Judge Smith, dissenting from the Fifth Circuit's deci-
sion not to rehear VALIC).
9. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, VALIC retreats from a policy of bank deregulation
that greatly expanded the financial products and services that
commercial banks now market.10
This Comment argues that the Fifth Circuit erred in
VALIC. Part I of the Comment provides a brief overview of the
United States commercial banking industry with particular em-
phasis on the successful efforts of bank agencies to increase se-
curities powers, and the less fruitful attempts to expand
insurance powers. Part II discusses VALIC and the Fifth Cir-
cuit's rationale for prohibiting the sale of annuities in cities with
more than 5000 persons. Part III critiques the court's reasoning
and concludes that the Fifth Circuit should have deferred to the
OCC interpretation that annuities are not insurance under § 92.
Notwithstanding the classification of annuities, § 92 imposes no
limit on national bank insurance powers. Thus, this Comment
proposes that pursuant to OCC approval, national banks may
market annuities and other insurance products without
limitation.
I. OVERVIEW OF COMMERCIAL BANKING: SECURITIES
AND INSURANCE POWERS
A. DuAL CHARTERING
The National Bank Act of 1864 (NBA) ii created the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency' 2 and empowered the OCC to
grant federal bank charters.' 3 Congress enacted the NBA to
10. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussing the disman-
tling of Glass-Steagall securities restrictions by bank agency interpretations).
11. National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1988)).
12. The OCC, an office within the United States Treasury Department, has
the responsibility of chartering and administering national banks. See PETER
S. ROSE, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF AmERICAN BANKING 83-84 (1987). The
OCC supervises the activities of federally-chartered banks by conducting peri-
odic examinations. See GEORGE G. KAUFmANN & ROGER C. KORMENDI, DEREGU-
LATING FINANCIAL SERVICES: PUBLIC POLICY IN FLUX 23-24 (1986). In general, a
federally-chartered national bank must seek approval from the OCC to engage
in any activity not expressly permitted by statute. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(7), 92a
(1988).
13. Congress modeled the National Bank Act on various state bank char-
tering laws, particularly the New York Free Banking Act of 1838. See Edward
L. Symons, The "Business of Banking" in Historical Perspective, 51 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 676, 689-90 (1983). In general, the state chartering laws provided that
parties with a prescribed amount of capital could engage in banking activities
without limitation. See id. at 689; KERRY COOPER & DONALD R. FRASER, BANK-
ING DEREGULATION AND THE NEW COMPETITION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 46
(1984). The lack of stringent legal barriers to bank entry during this period
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help the federal government finance the Civil War 14 and to es-
tablish an exclusively federal banking system. 15 Despite the
NBA, state-chartered banks flourished due to considerably
fewer restrictions than their federally-chartered counterparts. 16
The dual chartering system17 led federal regulators to in-
crease national bank powers to match those held by state
banks.' 8 Following the turn of the century, federal legislation
enabled national banks to operate branch banks,' 9 to loan on
real estate,20 and to sell insurance.21 Shortly after World War I,
gave rise to the term "free banking era." See ROSE, supra note 12, at 82;
COOPER & FRASER, supra, at 46-47. The National Bank Act, however, imposed
significant barriers to entry, including higher capitalization requirements than
most states required through state chartering laws. Id. at 48; see ROSE, supra
note 12, at 83-84.
14. Congress required all national banks to purchase federal bonds and pa-
per currency issued by the Treasury. ROBERT E. LrrAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS
Do? 20 (1987).
15. Prior to 1862, the United States had no national paper currency. Id.
State banks issued their own notes, many of which were worthless. Id. To ac-
count for multiple and potentially valueless bank notes, noteholders accepted
large discounts from face value. Id. Advocates of the National Bank Act envi-
sioned that state-chartered banks would convert to federal charters because na-
tional banks would offer more security to commercial transactions through the
creation and use of a uniform currency. Id. at 20-21.
16. Initially, few state banks converted to federal charters. Id. Congress
accelerated conversions by subsequently imposing a 10% tax on all state bank
notes. Id. The tax accomplished its immediate purpose, but the number of
state-chartered banks soon increased as a result of fewer constraints on bank-
ing activities. Id. For example, state banks could extend mortgages on real
estate, while national banks could only provide commercial credit. Id. At the
turn of the century, state-chartered banks still outnumbered national banks.
Id. at 21-22.
17. A commercial bank must obtain a corporate charter from either a fed-
eral or state banking agency. Linda B. Matarese, Has the Chevron Deference
Made a Difference When Courts Review Federal Bank Agency Interpretations of
the Glass-Steagall Act?, 33 How. L.J. 195, 214 (1990). A bank can convert from
a state to a federal charter, or from a federal to a state charter. Id. at 215; see
12 U.S.C. § 214-214c (1988).
18. See LITAN, supra note 14, at 22. One commentator notes that a compet-
itive dialectic between state and federal regulators inevitably results in the in-
cremental expansion of bank powers. See Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking
System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REv. 1, 30-36 (1977);
see also Matarese, supra note 17, at 216-17 (setting forth critics' argument that
federal bank regulators are "captured" and act in the private interest of those
regulated rather than the public interest).
19. Act of February 25, 1927, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228 (1927) (codi-
fied as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988)).
20. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, § 24, 38 Stat. 251, 273 (1913)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C § 371 (1988)).
21. Act of September 7, 1916, ch. 461, 39 Stat. 752, 753 (1916) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1988) (omitted since 1952)).
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Congress permitted national banks to underwrite corporate se-
curities.22 As a result of these expansive powers, both state and
federal commercial banks proliferated. 23
B. THE BANKING CMSIS OF THE 1930s AND REMEDIAL
LEGISLATION
Between 1930 and 1933 approximately one-third of the
nation's commercial banks failed.24 In response to the bank fail-
ures, Depression-era legislation created a comprehensive regu-
latory framework to ensure the solvency and stability of
commercial banks and to protect depositors' funds.25 The De-
22. After the Civil War, state-chartered banks were major participants in
the lucrative securities underwriting market that financed the railroad expan-
sion to the West. See LrrAN, supra note 14, at 22. National banks, however,
could not underwrite corporate securities. Id. Underwriting activity intensi-
fied after World War I, and Congress attempted to lessen the restraints on na-
tional banks by permitting underwriting of those securities approved by the
OCC. Id. at 23; see Act of February 25, 1927, ch. 191, § 2, 44 Stat. 1226 (1927)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1988)). At first, the Comptroller only
approved bank underwriting of corporate bonds. LiT~A, supra note 14, at 22.
Later, in response to the proliferation of state-chartered banks, the OCC per-
mitted underwriting of corporate equity. Id.
23. In the early 1920s, more than 30,000 commercial banks operated in the
United States. COOPER & FRASER, supra note 13, at 50. Technological advances
in transportation and communications made geographic expansion feasible for
commercial banks. LrrAN, supra note 14, at 24-25. The McFadden Act provided
national banks with the legal authority to open branch locations according to
the laws of their domiciliary state. Id. at 24. By 1929, multi-office banks held
more than half of all assets in the American banking system. Id.
24. LrrAN, supra note 14, at 25; see also COOPER & FRASER, supra note 13,
at 50 (describing impact of the Great Depression on the banking industry).
25. See ROSE, supra note 12, at 352; Emeric Fischer, Banking and Insur-
ance - Should Ever The Twain Meet?, 71 NEB. L. REV. 726, 737-51 (1992). When
President Roosevelt took office in 1933 the economy had collapsed, causing a
nationwide run on bank deposits. See COOPER & FRASER, supra note 13, at 50;
LITAN, supra note 14, at 25. Congress and the President quickly enacted The
Banking Act of 1933, legislation intended to restore public confidence in the
nation's banking system. RosE, supra note 12, at 352. Congress targeted com-
mercial banks for more stringent regulatory oversight than other financial in-
stitutions because of their public character as the guardians of American
savings and private wealth. See Joseph J. Norton, Up Against 'The Wall':
Glass-Steagall and the Dilemma of a Deregulated ('Regulated') Banking Envi-
ronment, 42 Bus. LAw. 327, 329 (1987).
The Banking Act of 1933 created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC) to insure bank deposits up to a specified amount. The Banking Act
of 1933, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 162, 168 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1811-32 (1988)). Congress created deposit insurance to give depositors confi-
dence in using commercial banks. COOPER & FRASER, supra note 13, at 145. In
addition, the FDIC brought state-chartered banks under federal supervision for
the first time. LITA, supra note 14, at 26.
Depression-era legislation attempted to prevent future commercial bank
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pression-era legislation brought the "free banking era" to an ab-
rupt end,26 establishing stringent regulatory oversight designed
to ensure a sound and stable banking system.27
In particular, Congress believed that commercial banks
buying, selling, and underwriting securities precipitated bank
failures.28 As a result, Congress enacted the Glass-Steagall pro-
visions of the Banking Act of 193329 to end commercial bank un-
derwriting and to severely limit other securities activities.30
failures by limiting competition among financial institutions. COOPER & FRA-
SER, supra note 13, at 54. Thus, legislation increased capitalization require-
ments and other barriers to entry, restricted permissible activities, and
imposed greater regulatory oversight on banks. Id. at 54-55.
The Depression-era legislation also sought to diffuse economic power. See
Fischer, supra, at 739. Toward this end, legislation restricted geographic ex-
pansion and bank affiliations with other industries. Id. at 737. The Glass-
Steagall provisions of the 1933 Act separated commercial and investment bank-
ing. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
26. Depression-era legislation limited bank entry. See RosE, supra note
12, at 86; see also COOPER & FRASER, supra note 13, at 52 (discussing end of
"free banking era"); Fischer, supra note 25, at 741-43 (discussing entry restric-
tions imposed by Depression-era legislation). The chartering laws required
that, to win approval, a federal bank charter applicant had to substantively
prove that a significant public need existed, and that the new bank would be
successful without injuring operating banks. See COOPER & FRASER, supra note
13, at 52. The FDIC can indirectly limit the entry of state banks by denying
deposit insurance to a state bank applicant. Id. Because deposit insurance is
generally necessary to operate a bank, the FDIC exercises de facto veto power
over state bank entry. Id.
27. The 1933 Act increased the regulatory oversight role of the Federal Re-
serve System, prohibited the payment of interest on demand deposits, and
raised the minimum capital requirements of national banks. See Banking Act
of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). The Depression-era legislation preferred
regulation to competition to restore stability in the banking system. See RosE,
supra note 12, at 353. Considering the economic circumstances of the 1930s in
hindsight, regulators may have been justified in promulgating over-reaching
regulation. See id. The present costs of over-regulation, however, may exceed
the benefits derived from safety and soundness in the banking system. Id. at
86. In addition, reformers may have overstated the costs attributed to the free
banking era. Id.
28. See Norton, supra note 25, at 329. Congress believed that excessive use
of bank credit to speculate in the stock market precipitated the 1929 stock mar-
ket crash and subsequent bank failures. Id.; see Matarese, supra note 17, at
221 (citing S. Rep. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-9 (statement of Sen. Glass)).
In addition, Congress thought that using customer deposits for investment into
corporate securities created unacceptable risks for commercial banks. Norton,
supra note 25, at 329. Furthermore, Congress believed that commercial banks
engaged in investment banking did not allocate credit or provide investment
advice impartially. Id. at 334.
29. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, §§ 16, 20-22, 48 Stat. 162, 184-189 (1933)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1988)).
30. The Banking Act of 1933 is sometimes referred to as the Glass-Steagall
Act. Norton, supra note 25, at 327 n.2. The term "Glass-Steagall" applies accu-
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Glass-Steagall advanced the Depression-era policy of limiting
competition among, and restricting permissible activities of, fi-
nancial institutions.31
C. JuDIcIAL DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Following the Depression era, federal bank agencies 32 ex-
panded national bank powers by liberally interpreting Glass-
Steagall and other banking laws. Courts generally noted that
bank agency regulations, opinions, and statutory interpretations
warranted judicial deference.33 Courts did not, however, apply a
consistent standard to review bank agency decisions. 34
In 1984 the Supreme Court defined the relationship be-
tween courts and administrative agencies in Chevron U.S.A.,
rately to only four key provisions of the 1933 Act, §§ 16, 20, 21 and 22. Id.
Together, these four provisions separated commercial from investment bank-
ing. See id. at 330-34. Commercial banks could not engage in underwriting or
dealing in securities, and investment banks could not accept deposits. Id.
31. See KAUFNum & KOmEmNDI, supra note 12, at 29; RosE, supra note 12,
at 352-54.
32. The OCC and the Federal Reserve Board are the two principal federal
bank agencies that determine permissible banking activities. The OCC ad-
ministers national banks. See supra notes 3, 12 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the responsibilities of the OCC). The Federal Reserve Board supervises
bank holding companies (BHC). See 12 U.S.C. § 1844 (1988). A BHC controls
25% or more of any class of voting securities of a bank, or if it otherwise exer-
cises a controlling influence on the management, policies, or elections of a bank.
12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (1988).
33. The Supreme Court articulated a presumption of judicial deference to
bank agency interpretations of banking laws in Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp,
401 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1971). Matarese, supra note 17, at 230. The Court then,
however, overturned an OCC regulation that authorized national banks to op-
erate open-end mutual funds because the OCC stated no reasons for its deci-
sion. Camp, 401 U.S. at 627. Thus, Camp illustrates that an unsubstantiated
bank agency decision does not warrant judicial deference because a court can-
not ascertain whether the decision-maker properly considered the impact of the
statute. See id. at 628.
Subsequent to Camp, courts generally deferred to bank agency interpreta-
tions concerning securities activities, but not concerning other areas. See Board
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46
(1981) (upholding Federal Reserve Board decision permitting bank holding
companies to act as investment advisers to a closed-end investment company);
New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Smith, 404 F. Supp. 1091 (D.C. 1975) (upholding
OCC approval of automatic investment service operated by national bank), va-
cated on other grounds sub nom., New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d
736 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom., New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Hei-
mann, 435 U.S. 942 (1978)); cf Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents,
399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968) (overturning OCC opinion allowing national
banks to operate insurance agencies); infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text
(discussing Saxon).
34. See Matarese, supra note 17, at 204-09.
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Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.3 5 Chevron in-
structs courts that administrative agencies perform day-to-day
law making.36 Because administrative agencies are politically
accountable branches, judicial deference to administrative deci-
sions effectuates the policy objectives of the electorate. 37
Chevron established a two-step test for review of an
agency's interpretation of a statute.38 If Congress clearly and
unambiguously stated its intent, both the agency and the court
must effectuate that intent.3 9 If, however, Congress did not di-
rectly address the question, or addressed the question ambigu-
ously, then the court must determine whether the agency
interpretation is a "permissible construction" of the statute.4 °
The agency need not adopt the only permissible construction,
nor the reading that the court would have reached on its own.41
The agency's construction controls unless it is "arbitrary, capri-
cious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."42
35. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron subordinated the judiciary to administra-
tive agencies when determining the meaning of statutes. Id. at 843-845; see
Matarese, supra note 17, at 206. D.C. Circuit Judge Abner J. Mikva notes that
Chevron creates a "hands off" policy that approaches "near abdication" to ad-
ministrative agencies. See Hon. Abner J. Mikva, How Should The Courts Treat
Administrative Agencies?, 36 Am. U. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (1986).
36. See Mikva, supra note 35, at 3. In Chevron the Court stated that "if
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express dele-
gation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute
by regulation .... Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a par-
ticular question is implicit rather than explicit." 467 U.S. at 843-44 (footnote
omitted).
37. The Court reasoned that "[]udges... are not part of either political
branch of the Government.... [I]t is entirely appropriate for [administrative
agencies] to make such policy choices - resolving the competing interests which
Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency...." Id. at 865-66. Furthermore, "federal judges-who
have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by
those who do." Id. at 866; see Mikva, supra note 35, at 3.
A court cannot circumvent Chevron and supersede an agency interpreta-
tion with its own policy preference. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 (arguing that
"the responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolv-
ing the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial
ones.. ."). Independent decision making by inexpert judges precludes utilizing
agency expertise to make technical policy choices. See Mikva, supra note 35, at
3. Some regulatory areas require heavy technical expertise and frequent over-
sight is efficiently accomplished only by utilizing administrative agencies. Id.
38. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 843.
41. Id. at 843, n.11.
42. Id. at 844.
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D. DISMANTLING GLASS-STEAGALL WITH THE HELP OF
CHEVRON
Chevron enabled bank regulators to "dismantle" Glass-Stea-
gall.43 Beginning in the 1970s, economic factors and rapid tech-
nological advances dramatically changed the landscape of the
financial services industry.44 Depression-era legislation re-
stricted commercial banks from effectively competing with other
financial institutions.45 Bank agencies responded during the
1980s by deregulating commercial banks, particularly the re-
strictions imposed by Glass-Steagall. 46 Bank agency interpreta-
43. See, e.g., Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 403-04 (1987)
(upholding an OCC opinion under Chevron allowing national banks to market
securities through retail discount brokerage subsidiaries located in their
branches). Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n illustrates the great extent to
which courts must defer to interpretations by the OCC. Id. at 403-04.
44. Interest rate ceilings imposed on banks proved untenable during the
double-digit inflation periods of the 1970s. LiTAN, supra note 14, at 33. In addi-
tion, rapid technological advances and "one-sided" regulation enabled other in-
stitutions, such as nonbanks, to effectively exploit market opportunities and to
replace commercial banks in many areas. Id. at 33-34; see Fischer, supra note
25, at 771-75 (discussing competition between nonbanks and commercial
banks).
A nonbank is an entity that provides either credit or depository functions,
but not both. See COOPER & FRASER, supra note 13, at 198-203. The size and
scope of nonbanking firms poses a significant threat to the market share of com-
mercial banks. See LrrAN, supra note 14, at 44. Diversified nonbank financial
institutions offer a wide range of depository, lending, and investment services
that commercial banks historically provided. Id. In addition, non-financial in-
dustrial companies have become leading providers of financial services. Id.
45. Nonbanks can compete in commercial bank markets, but commercial
banks cannot enter many nonbank markets. LITAN, supra note 14, at 41. In-
creasingly, commercial banks did not meet the credit needs of borrowers due to
the "one-sided" regulatory constraints. Id. Commercial enterprises obtained
short and intermediate term financing from the commercial paper markets. Id.
The booming securities market during the 1980s encouraged raising funds from
the capital markets rather than borrowing from banks. Id. at 42. Conse-
quently, commercial banks lost market share as providers of credit. See id. at
45 (Figure 2-7).
As a result of increased competition in the credit markets, commercial
banks assumed riskier loans to boost profitability. Id. at 49. Commercial banks
lent to higher-risk borrowers because low-risk borrowers utilized alternative
sources. Id. Thus, one-sided regulation jeopardized the structural soundness of
commercial banks. Id.
46. The Reagan Administration favored deregulating commercial banks.
Id. at 49. See generally Joseph Jude Norton, The 1982 Banking Act and the
Deregulation Scheme, 38 Bus. LAw. 1627 (1983) (examing the deregulation
scheme after the 1982 legislation). In 1980, Congress removed the interest rate
controls the Banking Act of 1933 placed on national banks. See Depository In-
stitutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, § 207, 94 Stat. 132,
144 (1980) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3501-09 (1988)). In 1988, Con-
gress considered repealing certain sections of Glass-Steagall to allow banks to
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tions, generously upheld under Chevron, substantially displaced
prohibitions on dealing and underwriting securities. 47 By 1990,
bank holding companies and national banks could operate dis-
count and full service brokerages, as well as engage in limited
underwriting and dealing in commercial paper, corporate debt
and equity, municipal revenue bonds, and mortgage-backed
securities.48
E. NATIONAL BANK INSURANCE POWERS
Increasingly, commercial banks have sought authority to
market insurance and other non-traditional financial prod-
ucts.4 9 Bank regulators, however, have resisted expanding bank
insurance powers due partly to the historical perception that
banking and insurance are distinct industries. 50 Congress has
underwrite all types of securities except corporate equity. See Matarese, supra
note 17, at 217. Congress did not act, but several Senators and Representatives
encouraged banks to expand powers through banking agencies. Id. (citing
Proxmire and Gan Urge Greenspan to Let BHCs Underwrite Debt, Equity Se-
curities, 51 Banking Rep. (BNA) 829 (Nov. 14, 1988)).
47. In 1987 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board)
approved the application of several bank holding companies seeking to engage
in underwriting of and dealing in certain "ineligible securities," activities ex-
pressly prohibited under § 20 of Glass-Steagall. Citicorp, 73 FED. RESERVE
BULL. 473 (1987). The Board determined that a member bank may underwrite
ineligible securities through a subsidiary so long as the subsidiary is not "en-
gaged principally" in underwriting ineligible securities. Id. at 475-77. A sub-
sidiary is "engaged principally" in an activity if it derives five percent or more of
its average gross revenues over a two-year period from that activity. Id. at 483.
The Second Circuit upheld the Board's interpretation based on Chevron. See
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47,
69 (2d Cir. 1988). Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors precipitated the
"dismantling of Glass-Steagall." See Fischer, supra note 25, at 782. In 1989,
the Board expanded the class of securities that banks can underwrite to include
all types of corporate debt and equity. J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc., 75 FED. RE-
SERVE BULL. 192, 193 (1989). Later that year, the Board determined that a
BHC could earn up to 10% of its gross revenues from underwriting without
being "engaged principally" in that activity. See 75 FED. RESERVE BULL. 751
(1989).
48. Fischer, supra note 25, at 783.
49. See id. Commercial banks did not initially engage in broad insurance
activities because of the relatively lower returns available when compared to
investment banking. LITAN, supra note 14, at 72. Larger banks, however,
seemingly could benefit by selling insurance because they could market insur-
ance more aggressively than existing insurance company agents. Id. at 72-73
n.27 (citing CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, THE POTENTIAL COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF ALLOWING BANKS TO SELL INSURANCE (1987)). American consum-
ers would benefit most, saving five to seven billion dollars per year as a result of
the increased competition. Id.
50. See MICHAEL G. CAPATIDES, A GUIDE To THE CAPITAL MARKETS AcTM-
TIES OF BANKS AND BANx HOLDING COMPANIES 244, 247 (1990).
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generally acquiesced to insurance industry lobbying efforts and
refused to expand national bank insurance powers. 51 Further-
more, the pre-Chevron practice of judicial deference to bank
agencies generally did not extend to national bank insurance
powers.52 Even after Chevron, some courts narrowly inter-
preted national bank insurance powers relying on those pre-
Chevron decisions.53
National banks may engage in insurance activities pursu-
ant to 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) 54 and 12 U.S.C. § 92.55 Neither § 24(7)
nor § 92 expressly limits national bank insurance activities.
51. Id. at 244. For example, the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987
created a moratorium on any action by federal banking agencies to increase
insurance powers. See Competitive Equality Banking Act §§ 201-202, 101 Stat.
581-584 (1987) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841 in a note since expiration of the
moratorium). The moratorium expired in March 1988. CAPATLDES, supra note
50, at 244. In addition, the insurance industry successfully lobbied Congress to
restrict the insurance activities of bank holding company subsidiaries in the
Garn-St. Germain Act. See Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469, 1536-1538 (1982) (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(A)-(G) (1988)); Ralph P. DeSanto, Note, Product Ex-
pansion in the Banking Industry: An Analysis and Revision of Section 4(c)(8) of
the Bank Holding Company Act, 53 FORDHAi L. REV. 1127, 1142 (1985).
52. See Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010, 1013-
17 (5th Cir. 1968); infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (discussing Saxon).
53. See American Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2959 (1993); infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text
(discussing American Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke).
54. Section 24(7) states "[a national bank shall have power to] exercise...
all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of
banking." 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1988) (emphasis added). Thereafter, § 24(7) enu-
merates specific activities in which national banks can engage. Section 24(7) is
commonly referred to as the "powers clause." See Symons, supra note 13, at
698.
Section 24(7) does not expressly grant insurance powers to national banks.
Insurance powers derive from the "business of banking" clause and the "inci-
dental powers" clause. Id. at 683. Although the OCC has relied on the "inciden-
tal powers" clause to approve insurance activities, some commentators contend
that the "business of banking" clause grants the authority to engage in many
financial activities, including insurance. Id. at 680. See generally American
Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke, 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that the "business of
banking" includes activities beyond those enumerated in § 24(7)); Independent
Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (upholding
national bank authority to broker credit life insurance under § 24(7)), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980).
55. Section 92 states that "any such [national bank] located and doing busi-
ness in any place the population of which does not exceed five thousand inhabit-
ants ... may, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the
Comptroller of the Currency, act as the agent for any fire, life or other insur-
ance company ... by soliciting and selling insurance and collecting premiums
on policies issued by such company." 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1988) (omitted since 1952);
see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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Bank agencies and courts, therefore, have determined permissi-
ble commercial bank insurance activities. To date, the Supreme
Court has remained silent on the substantive scope of national
bank insurance powers under § 92.56
In 1963 Comptroller James Saxon, a strong proponent of ex-
panding commercial bank powers, 57 promulgated an OCC ruling
that permitted national banks to sell insurance incidental to
banking transactions.58 The Fifth Circuit, however, overturned
the OCC ruling in Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Independent Insur-
ance Agents,59 holding that § 92 prohibits national banks from
operating insurance agencies in cities where the population ex-
ceeds 5000 persons.60 The court concluded that the express
grant of insurance powers in § 92 defines the full extent of na-
tional bank insurance powers. 61
Saxon jeopardized all insurance-related activities at most
national bank locations, including a long standing practice of
56. But see United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am.,
113 S. Ct. 2173, 2176-77 (1993) (holding that Congress did not repeal 12 U.S.C.
§ 92, but failing to address the substantive meaning of § 92). For a discussion
of the Court's decision that 12 U.S.C. § 92 was not repealed, see supra note 5
and accompanying text.
57. See LITAN, supra note 14, at 31.
58. OCC Ruling No. 7110 (1963). The OCC ruling stated that "[i]ncidental
to the powers vested in [national banks] under 12 U.S.C. sections 24, 84, and
371, National Banks have the authority to act as agent in the issuance of insur-
ance which is incident to banking transactions." Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of In-
dep. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010, 1012 (1968) (quoting OCC Ruling No. 7110
(1963)). The OCC did not limit its ruling to cities of 5000 persons or fewer. Id.
Subsequently, the OCC approved the application of Citizens and Southern Na-
tional Bank to sell broad forms of automobile, home, casualty, and liability in-
surance in branches located in cities with more than 5000 persons. Id.
59. 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968).
60. Id. at 1012.
61. Id. The Fifth Circuit rejected the claim that insurance powers exist
outside of§ 92 based on the expressio unius est exclusio alterius rule of statutory
construction. Id. at 1013-14. The expressio unius rule of statutory construction
means that the mention of one thing in the statute implies the exclusion of
another. Id. at 1014. Accordingly, the express power to operate insurance
agencies in cities with fewer than 5000 persons implies that national banks
lack the power to do the same in cities with more than 5000 persons. Id. at
1013. The Fifth Circuit supported its construction with the legislative history
of § 92. Id. The court noted that Congress enacted 12 U.S.C. § 92 in response
to a letter by Comptroller John Skelton Williams in 1916. Id. (citing 53 CONG.
REC. 11,001 (1916)). The Comptroller's letter stated that national banks
neither have the express nor the implied authority to act as insurance agents.
Id. The Comptroller, therefore, recommended that Congress grant insurance
powers to national banks located in small towns. Id.
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selling credit life insurance. 62 Subsequently, in Independent
Bankers Ass'n of America v. Heimann,63 the D.C. Circuit held
that the sale of credit life insurance did not violate § 92.64 In
Heimann, the court determined that national banks have cer-
tain insurance powers under § 24(7) not subject to § 92.65 Ac-
cording to the D.C. Circuit, the Saxon construction of § 92
applied only to national banks operating general insurance
agencies. 66 The court concluded that selling credit life insur-
ance is incidental to lending, an activity expressly authorized in
§ 24(7).67
The Eighth Circuit also disagrees with the Saxon construc-
tion of § 92. In Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. v.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,68 the Eighth
Circuit ignored Saxon and held that § 92 does not apply to a
62. See Barry A. Abbott et al., Banks and Insurance: An Update, 43 Bus.
LAw. 1005, 1016 (1988).
63. 613 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980).
64. Id. at 1170. Credit life insurance is a form of security on consumer
loans. Id. at 1168. A borrower purchases credit life insurance to satisfy the
loan in the event of a casualty. Id. at 1168 n.9.
65. Id. at 1170. The court disagreed with the Saxon interpretation that
§ 92 limits national bank insurance activities. Id. According to the court, § 92
creates no limit on national bank insurance activities in cities with more than
5000 persons. Id. at 1170 n.18.
66. Id. at 1170.
67. Id. According to the D.C. Circuit, national banks have incidental pow-
ers to pursue all activities related to the "business of banking" activities enu-
merated in 12 U.S.C. § 24(7). Id. Credit life insurance is a commonplace
product when ordinary loans on security are involved. Id. Thus, a bank has the
incidental power to sell credit life insurance under § 24(7) notwithstanding
§ 92. Id.
The D.C. Circuit avoided applying § 92 to a national bank insurance activ-
ity in American Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke, 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The court
upheld an OCC decision allowing a national bank to sell municipal bond insur-
ance. Id. at 281-82. To reach its decision, the court deferred to the OCC's inter-
pretation that municipal bond insurance was the functional equivalent of
issuing a standby letter of credit, a service traditionally provided by national
banks under 12 U.S.C. § 24(7). Id. at 281-82. The court expressed that the
term "business of banking" in § 24(7) includes activities beyond those specifi-
cally enumerated. Id. at 281. Confining bank activities to those specifically
enumerated in 12 U.S.C. § 24(7), or those merely incident thereto, reflects "a
narrow and artificially rigid view of both the business of banking and the [Na-
tional Bank Act]." Id. (quoting the district court decision in American Ins. Ass'n
v. Clarke, 656 F.Supp 404, 408 (D.D.C. 1987), affd 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir.
1988)). Under Chevron, "the Comptroller's expert judgment in this regard
should not be overturned." Id. at 283 (quoting district court decision in Ameri-
can Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke, 656 F.Supp at 409-10). Thus, the Saxon construction
of§ 92 does not apply to insurance activities within the broad parameters of the
"business of banking" powers of § 24(7).
68. 736 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1984).
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bank holding company's (BHC) national banks when the BHC's
insurance agencies are separate subsidiaries. 69
Responding to the favorable shift toward commercial bank
insurance powers, the OCC extended national bank insurance
powers into areas less related to traditional bank activities.70
The Second Circuit, however, recently took a narrow view of na-
tional bank insurance powers in American Land Title Ass'n v.
69. Id. at 470. The Board permitted two BHCs, Commerce Bancshares,
Inc. (Commerce) and Mercantile Bancorporation, Inc. (Mercantile), to sell cer-
tain kinds of insurance through a separate subsidiary to customers of its oper-
ating banks. Id. For example, the subsidiary may sell car insurance, collision,
and liability, to a customer of the bank who borrowed money to buy the car. Id.
at 471. Mercantile and Commerce operated several national banks in cities
with more than 5000 persons. Id. at 476. The insurance association plaintiff
argued that the sale of insurance violated 12 U.S.C. § 92. Id. The court noted
that Saxon was difficult to distinguish from this situation, yet openly criticized
and questioned the validity of the Saxon construction of § 92:
There is a strong argument that Saxon was wrongly decided. The leg-
islative history indicates that Congress was concerned only with pro-
viding small-town banks with an additional profit source, not with
prohibiting city banks from selling insurance. Despite our doubts
about Saxon's validity, we prefer not to disagree openly with a sister
circuit, and find it unnecessary to do so.
Id. at 477 n.6. The court concluded that Saxon did not apply because the opera-
tions of the banks and insurance subsidiaries were separate. Id. at 477. Thus,
a BHC can circumvent "whatever strictures § 92, as interpreted by Saxon, im-
pose[s]" by separately incorporating its national bank and insurance agency
subsidiaries. Id.
After the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982, a BHC may not engage in certain
insurance activities through nonbanking subsidiaries. See supra note 51 and
accompanying text; 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988). The nonbanking prohibitions
of 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) do not apply, however, to the direct activities of BHC
banks. See Merchant National Corporation, 75 FED. RESERVE BuLL. 388 (1989);
Independent Ins. Agents of Am. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 890
F.2d 1275, 1283 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that § 1843(c) insurance activity
prohibitions do not apply to BHC's state-chartered banks), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 810 (1990). Thus, while a BHC may not directly engage in certain insur-
ance activities through a nonbanking subsidiary, a BHC may engage in those
insurance activities through its bank subsidiaries as long as the chartering au-
thority has approved such activities. See id. at 1279-80.
70. The OCC authorized national banks to broker annuity contracts to
bank customers. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 331, [1985-1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) $ 85,501 (Apr. 4, 1985); OCC Interpretive
Letter No. 499, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) $
83,090 (Feb. 12, 1990). In two interpretive letters, the OCC authorized national
banks to sell and underwrite title insurance. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 368,
[1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,538 (July 11,
1986); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 377, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 9 85,601 (Feb. 6, 1987); see also OCC Interpretive Let-
ter No. 366, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,536
(Aug. 18, 1986) (concluding that § 92 places no geographical limitation on the
insurance activities of a national bank in a town of fewer than 5000 persons).
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Clarke,71 holding that § 92 prohibits national banks from selling
title insurance in cities with more than 5000 persons.72 The
court based its decision on the Saxon construction of § 92. 73
Furthermore, the Second Circuit rejected the D.C. Circuit's
holding in Heimann that § 24(7) provides insurance powers not
subject to limitation by § 92.74
Notwithstanding the adverse impact of American Land Ti-
tle Ass'n v. Clarke, national banks discovered a loophole to avoid
the Saxon limitation on national bank insurance powers. In In-
dependent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. v. Ludwig,75 the
D.C. Circuit upheld an OCC opinion and concluded that § 92 im-
poses no geographical limitation on a national bank insurance
agency located in a town of fewer than 5000 persons.76 Ludwig
provided a significant victory for national banks because such
banks can simply locate branches in towns of fewer than 5000
persons and market insurance products into cities with more
than 5000 persons.77 Unfortunately, commercial banks proba-
71. 968 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2959 (1993).
72. Id. at 157.
73. Id. at 156. The court first recognized that the Chevron standard of re-
view was applicable. Id. at 154-55. Next, the court followed the Saxon expres-
sio unius est exclusio alterius construction of § 92 and concluded that Congress
intended to prohibit any general insurance agency activity of a national bank in
towns with more than 5000 persons. Id. at 155. To support its construction,
the court referenced the 1916 letter to Congress by Comptroller John Skelton
Williams that proposed giving banks the power to operate insurance agencies in
small towns. Id. at 155-56 (citing 53 CONG. REC. 11,001 (1916)).
74. The court criticized the Heimann position that § 92 imposes no limita-
tion on national bank insurance activities. Id. at 156-57. According to the Sec-
ond Circuit, if Congress wanted all banks to possess insurance powers
regardless of location, then the population provision would be superfluous. Id.
at 155. Notwithstanding § 92, the court distinguished Heimann based on the
unique nature of credit life insurance. Id. at 156. Title insurance differs from
credit life insurance because title insurance protects both the borrower's and
the lender's interest, whereas credit life insurance only protects the lender's
interest. Id. at 157. Thus, credit life insurance constitutes a banking activity
and title insurance an insurance activity. Id.
75. 997 F.2d. 958 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
76. Id. at 958. The OCC interpretive letter stated that "a national bank or
its branch which is located in a place of 5,000 or under population may sell
insurance to existing and potential customers located anywhere." Id. at 959
(quoting Letter from Judith A. Walter, Senior Deputy Comptroller for National
Operations, to U.S. National Bank of Oregon).
77. Chase Manhattan and other national banks may circumvent the Amer-
ican Land Title Ass'n decision and sell title insurance nationwide through a
small town branch. See Arthur D. Postal, OCC Chase Stratagem Exploits In-
surance Rule, FDIC WATCH, Oct. 11, 1993, at 1. The Ludwig decision prompted
intense lobbying efforts by the insurance industry to close the "small-town loop-
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bly cannot effectively sell annuities from distant branches. 78
Thus, while liberalizing bank insurance powers dramatically,
Ludwig does not resolve the dilemma national banks face in
marketing annuities.
II. VALIC: NATIONAL BANK ANNUITY SALES LIMITED
BY 12 U.S.C. § 92
The OCC opined that national banks may market fixed and
variable annuities in their branches pursuant to 12 U.S.C.§ 24(7) and that 12 U.S.C. § 92 does not apply to the sale of an-
nuity contracts by national banks.79 Subsequently, the OCC ap-
hole." See David W. Roderer, VIEWPOINT: Congress Should Defer Action on
Bank Annuity Sales, AM. BANKER, Nov. 3, 1993, at 12.
78. See Postal, supra note 77, at 1. Selling annuities by mail and via
telemarketing is not feasible. Id. Banks will probably exploit Ludwig with
other forms of insurance more easily sold by mail and telephone solicitations.
Id.
79. In 1985, the OCC permitted national banks to broker variable annui-
ties through discount brokerage subsidiaries. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 331,
[1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,501, at 77,773
(Apr. 4, 1985). Variable annuity contracts provide an accumulation unit in a
separate investment portfolio in exchange for a lump sum or periodic payment.
Id. At maturity, the annuitant receives a pro rata share of the portfolio for
either a fixed term or life. Id. The OCC acknowledged that variable annuities
expose issuers to the risk that the annuitant will outlive the expected mortality
date. Id. at 77,774. In that regard, issuers may structure the payments accord-
ing to detailed mortality tables. Id. A variable annuity, however, does not
guarantee any payment at maturity and therefore, the investment risk falls
entirely on the annuitant. Id. Thus, despite the feature of mortality risk, a
variable annuity more closely resembles shares in a mutual fund. Id. The OCC
cited cases supporting its reasoning. Id. (citing SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins.
Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1966); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971)).
As such, variable annuities are securities that a national bank can buy and sell
without recourse under 12 U.S.C. § 24(7). Id.
In 1990, the OCC approved the sale of fixed annuity contracts by national
banks. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 499, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) T 83,090, at 71,210 (Feb. 12, 1990). A fixed annuity
provides a guaranteed payment for a fixed term, or life, in exchange for the
premium, or premiums, paid by the annuitant. Id. at 71,212. National banks
may sell fixed annuities pursuant to their general power to broker financial
instruments. Id. at 71,213. Although historically a product of insurance com-
panies, the OCC determined that annuities are financial investment products,
not insurance. Id. The OCC noted that investors purchase annuities to provide
tax-sheltered saving for retirement, not to shift financial risk of catastrophic
events as in the case of insurance. Id. at 71,212 ; see also In re Howerton, 21
B.R. 621, 623 (1982) (opining that "life insurance is a promise to pay a certain
sum on the death of an insured and an annuity is essentially a form of invest-
ment"); APPLEmAN, supra note 2, at 295 (arguing that "annuity contracts must
... be recognized as investments rather than insurance"). Thus, the "risk is
essentially an investment risk, not an insurance risk." OCC Interpretive Letter
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proved the application of NCNB National Bank of North
Carolina to sell fixed and variable annuity contracts through its
subsidiary NCNB Securities.80 On April 16, 1991, the Variable
Annuity Life Insurance Company (the Company) filed suit seek-
ing declaratory and injunctive relief against the OCC.81 The
Company claimed that the sale of annuities by national banks
violated 12 U.S.C. § 92.82 On cross motions for summary judg-
ment, the district court granted the OCC's motion and denied
the Company's.8 3 The district court found that Congress never
specifically addressed whether national banks can sell annuity
contracts.8 4 The court then upheld the OCC opinion because the
No. 499, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) T 83,090, at
71,212 (Feb. 12, 1990); see also Helvering v. LeGierse, 312 U.S. 531, 542 (1941)
(reasoning that "any risk that the [premium] would earn less than the amount
paid to respondent as an annuity was an investment risk... not an insurance
risk"). In addition, annuity contracts resemble debt instruments because an
issuer's obligation to make periodic payments resembles that of a debtor. OCC
Interpretive Letter No. 499, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 83,090, at 71,212-13 (Feb. 12, 1990). Furthermore, the OCC reasoned
that a fixed annuity functionally resembles a certificate of deposit (CD). Id. at
71,213. A fixed annuity for a fixed term resembles a CD that withdraws a por-
tion of principal to reduce the balance to zero at the end of the term. Id. An
annuity with a life term operates like a CD with a life interest in the income.
Id. The OCC concluded that banks sell other financial instruments that entail
the two principal features of a fixed annuity, life term and fixed return. Id.
The OCC also disagreed with the Saxon interpretation of § 92. Id. Con-
gress did not define "insurance" in § 92. Id. at 71,214. The OCC cited various
dictionary definitions and cases to support its decision that annuities are not
"insurance" within the meaning of § 92. Id. The OCC determined, however,
that even under Saxon, § 92 does not prohibit the sale of annuities. Id. at
71,215. According to the OCC, the Saxon limitation applies, if at all, only to
broad forms of insurance, such as fire or life insurance, and does not affect spe-
cialized products such as annuities. Id.
80. OCC Unpublished Interpretive Letter from J. Michael Shepherd, Se-
nior Deputy Comptroller Corporate & Economic Programs, to Robert M.
Kurucza, Attorney on behalf of NCNB National Bank of North Carolina (March
20, 1990), available in LEXIS, Banking Library, ALLOCC File.
81. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 786 F. Supp. 639, 640 (S.D.
Tex. 1991).
82. Id. The Company sells annuities in all fifty states and directly com-
peted with NCNB in the business of selling annuity contracts. VALIC, 998 F.2d
at 1297.
83. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 786 F. Supp. at 640.
84. Id. at 641. According to the district court, Congress did not address
whether banks may sell insurance in cities with more than 5000 persons or the
meaning of insurance under § 92. Id. The court noted that the plain language
of § 92 expressly grants national banks the authority to operate insurance
agencies in cities with fewer than 5000 persons. Id. The language does not
expressly prohibit national bank insurance activities and "it is neither arbitrary
nor capricious to view 12 U.S.C. § 92 as a supplemental powers provision and
not a limitation on national banksl'] incidental powers under § 24(7)." Id. at
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OCC's interpretation was a "permissible construction" under
Chevron. 5 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court and concluded that the sale of annuities by national banks
violated 12 U.S.C. § 92.86
According to the Fifth Circuit, the Saxon interpretation of§ 92 exhibits Congress's clear intent to limit national bank in-
surance activities to cities with fewer than 5000 persons; there-
fore, the district court never should have reached the second
step of Chevron.8 7 The court relied on the expressio unius est
exclusio alterius construction of § 92 set forth in Saxon to reach
this conclusion.88 The court supported its construction by noting
that the legislative record of § 92 indicates that national banks
should operate insurance agencies only in small communities.8 9
Furthermore, the court contended that the OCC cannot invoke
Chevron to overrule the judicial precedent established by
Saxon.90
642. The court also noted that the legislative record indicates that Congress
enacted § 92 to provide an additional source of income for national banks lo-
cated in small towns, not to protect insurance companies from competition. Id.
at 641.
The district court observed that § 92 does not define "insurance." Id. Con-
gressional silence, combined with express rulemaking authority delegated to
the OCC, "left a gap for the [Comptroller] to fill." Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). The
OCC determined that annuities were financial investment instruments, not in-
surance products, because they do not indemnify against risk of loss. Id.
85. Id. at 642 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
86. VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1296. The Fifth Circuit applies de novo review on
an appeal from summary judgment when questions of law control the disposi-
tion. Id. at 1297.
87. Id. The court first observed that 12 U.S.C. § 92 exists after U.S. Nat'l
Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., 113 S. Ct. 2173 (1993). VALIC, 998
F.2d at 1297-98; see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
88. Id. at 1298. In addition, the Second Circuit recently followed Saxon in
reversing an OCC directive permitting national banks to sell title insurance.
Id.; see American Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1992); supra
notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing American Land Title Ass'n v.
Clarke).
89. VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1298-99. The only source of legislative history con-
cerning § 92 is a 1916 letter from Comptroller John Skelton Williams to Con-
gress proposing that national banks should have the authority to act as
insurance agents. To support its construction of § 92, the Fifth Circuit cited a
portion of that letter that states "from the standpoint of public policy and bank-
ing efficiency that this authority should be limited to banks in small communi-
ties." Id. at 1299 (citing 53 CONG. REc. 11,001 (1916)).
90. Id. at 1300 (citing Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992); BPS
Grand Services, Inc. v. NLRB, 942 F.2d 519, 523 (8th Cir. 1991)). The OCC
questioned the precedential weight of Saxon because the case was decided six-
teen years before Chevron. Id.
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The Fifth Circuit then held that annuities are insurance
products, both historically and functionally.91 All fifty states
regulate annuities under their insurance laws. 92 Annuities are
insurance products because "functionally they are the mirror
image of life insurance."93 In addition, life insurance and annui-
ties both rely in part on actuarial calculations of mortality
risk.94 The Fifth Circuit concluded that annuities are insurance
and therefore, § 92 prohibits the sale of annuities in cities with
more than 5000 persons.95
The Fifth Circuit rejected the OCC's argument that, under
Heimann, § 92 only applies to broad insurance activities 96 by
stating that this distinction would require courts to create an
arbitrary distinction between general and specialized insurance
products.97 According to the Fifth Circuit, giving banks the
power to sell insurance under § 24(7) would render § 92 super-
fluous. 98 Moreover, the court reasoned that Heimann did not
91. Id. at 1300-01
92. Id. at 1306.
93. Id. at 1301. The court reasoned that "[aln annuity contract is the exact
inverse of a life insurance contract." Id. (emphasis added). By "exact inverse,"
the court refers to the typical payment structure of annuities and life insurance
policies. See id. In exchange for periodic payments, a life insurance contract
provides a lump sum upon the death of the insured. Id. An annuity provides an
annuitant periodic payments in exchange for a lump sum. Id. Although accu-
rate, life insurance and annuity contracts offer other payment structures as
well. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 499, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83,090 (Feb. 12, 1990).
94. VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1301. Both life insurance and annuities transfer
the economic risk of death from the policyholder or annuitant to the insurance
company. Id. Life insurance protects the insured from premature death, and
an annuity protects the annuitant from outliving forecasted mortality. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The OCC argued that even if annuities are insurance products, the
Saxon construction of § 92 only applies to "general" types of insurance. Id.
Saxon reversed an OCC ruling which allowed a national bank to sell "broad
forms of automobile, home, casualty and liability insurance." See Saxon v.
Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010, 1012 (5th Cir. 1968); supra
notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing Saxon). According to the OCC,
annuities are a specialized insurance product to which Saxon does not apply.
VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1301-02. Furthermore, the OCC contended that annuities
are analogous to credit life insurance which Heimann held national banks were
permitted to sell. Id. at 1302.
97. VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1302. The court also noted that the Second Circuit
dismissed the same argument in American Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d
150, 156-57 (2d Cir. 1992). VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1302; see supra notes 71-74 and
accompanying text (discussing American Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke). The court
noted that annuities are no less a "general" type of insurance than land title
insurance. VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1302.
98. VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1303. As such, § 92 reflects Congress's understand-
ing that national banks did not have incidental powers to sell insurance under
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apply because, unlike credit life insurance, selling annuities is
not closely related to the business of banking.99
The Fifth Circuit concluded that Saxon compelled its deci-
sion in VALIC. 00 Since 1968 Congress has not modified the
Saxon construction of § 92.101 The court admonished national
banks for seeking more power than that granted by statute and
recommended that banks "look to Congress, not the Comptroller
... or the courts" to expand insurance powers.10 2 Thus, the
Fifth Circuit reversed the district court and held that the OCC
decision allowing NCNB to sell annuities in towns with more
than 5000 persons violated 12 U.S.C. § 92.103
III. A NEW VIEW ON ANNUITIES AND NATIONAL BANK
INSURANCE POWERS
VALIC represents a major set-back for the banking indus-
try's push into insurance markets. VALIC not only restricts cer-
tain national banks from participating in the billion dollar
annuity market, 10 4 but also reflects an unduly narrow interpre-
tation of national bank insurance powers.105 In addition, VALIC
jeopardizes the relationship established by Chevron between
federal courts and administrative agencies.10 6 Bank agency de-
§ 24(7). Id. The Fifth Circuit additionally stated that even if selling annuities
is incidental to banking, selling annuities is not "necessary." Id. at 1302. Sec-
tion 24(7) provides, in part, that national banks shall have "all such incidental
powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking." 12 U.S.C.
§ 24(7) (1988).
99. VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1302. Both the Fifth and Second Circuits view na-
tional banks selling credit life insurance as simply charging a higher price for
the loan. Id. In addition, the Fifth Circuit noted that notwithstanding the gen-
eral grant of power in § 24(7), the § 92 limitation controls. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1303.
102. Id. (quoting Saxon, 399 F.2d at 1021 (Thornberry, J., concurring)).
103. Id.
104. See supra note 1 (noting magnitude of the income generated by na-
tional banks from sale of annuities). The decision does not presently affect na-
tional bank annuity sales outside the Fifth Circuit. Robert M. Garsson, Courts
Slam Lid on Annuity Sales in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, AM. BANKER, Aug.
31, 1993, at 2 (quoting Ronald Glancz).
105. One commentator notes, "[tlhe way the decision is written, it seems to
me that taking the case to the Supreme Court will be a win or lose all decision."
IBAA Breaks Ranks on Insurance, AM. BANIKR Sept. 6, 1993, at 8 (quoting an
unidentified banking industry lawyer). But see supra note 8 (discussing likeli-
hood that OCC will seek review by Supreme Court based on manner its petition
for rehearing en banc was rejected). Michael F. Crotty of the American Bankers
Association noted that the court took a "parsimonious view of incidental pow-
ers." See Garsson, supra note 104, at 2.
106. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text (discussing judicial defer-
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cisions now lack finality, and reliance on regulatory approval by
banks may be costly. 10 7
A. ANNUITY CONTRACTS ARE NOT INSURANCE UNDER 12
U.S.C. § 92
The Fifth Circuit stated that it "must determine the appli-
cability [or inapplicability] of § 92 to the sale of annuities."1 08
Section 92 only applies if annuities are insurance. The Fifth
Circuit, therefore, should have begun its analysis by asking
whether annuities are insurance. Instead, the Fifth Circuit first
upheld the Saxon construction of § 92 and then addressed
whether annuities are insurance. 109 The court's approach re-
quires a finding that annuities are insurance: otherwise the ini-
tial analysis of § 92 becomes irrelevant dictum.
Noting the ambiguity in § 92, the district court correctly ob-
served that "Ib]ecause § 92 is silent with respect to defining the
term 'insurance,' the court must defer to any reasonable inter-
pretation by the Comptroller on that issue.""l0 Congress did not
define "insurance" in § 92.111 In addition, the legislative record
does not indicate the products or activities to be included by the
term "insurance."112 The OCC determined that annuities are
ence to administrative agency statutory interpretations). Although the Fifth
Circuit claimed to apply the Chevron standard of review in determining the
scope of § 92, the court ignored Chevron when reviewing the OCC's interpreta-
tion that annuities are not "insurance" under § 92. VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1300-
01.
107. Banks rely on the fee income annuity sales generate. See Karen Talley,
NEWS ANALYSIS: Courts Leave Banks in Limbo On Right to Market Annui-
ties, Am. BANKER Sept. 28, 1993, at 12. According to Michael F. Crotty, deputy
general counsel with the American Bankers Association, "[w]e wish all this
would get straightened out so we know what we are doing." Id. Until the legal
issues are resolved, some banks will utilize outside marketing firms to sell an-
nuities in their branches. Id. National banks may enter percentage leases with
insurance agents pursuant to a 1983 OCC opinion. See OCC Interpretive Let-
ter No. 274, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) $ 85,434
(Dec. 2, 1983). Under this alternative approach, however, banks must share fee
income. See Talley, supra, at 12. Furthermore, many of the outside marketing
firms fear that VALIC jeopardizes all annuity sales in national banks. Id.
108. VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1298.
109. See id. at 1298-1300.
110. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 786 F. Supp. 639, 641 (S.D.
Tex. 1991).
111. See 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1988) (omitted since 1952).
112. See 53 CONG. REc. 11,001 (1916) (Letter of Comptroller Williams pro-
posing legislation). Comptroller Williams stated that Congress should permit
national banks "to act as agents for insurance companies in the placing of poli-
cies of insurance - fire, life, etc.. . ."in towns with fewer than 3000 persons. Id.
The letter did not mention the sale of annuities. See id.
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not "insurance" under § 92."13 Thus, the Fifth Circuit should
have reviewed the OCC interpretation under the second step of
Chevron to determine whether this is a "permissible
construction.""l 4
Courts and commentators widely recognize annuities as an
investment vehicle clearly different from insurance."15 Insur-
ance involves a different form of risk than annuities."16 The is-
suer of an insurance contract bears an immediate risk of
indemnifying a loss. 1 1 7 Annuity contracts, however, create no
immediate risk for the issuer.1 8 Instead, the investor bears the
risk of not realizing future income."19 The Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that annuities are insurance because of this "mirror im-
age" inverse relationship.1 20 The court's counter-intuitive
conclusion contradicts general authority.121
In addition, annuities and life insurance serve different pur-
113. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
114. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
115. "Ordinarily, it is recognized, even by laymen, that contracts of life in-
surance and of annuity are distinctly different." APPLEMAN, supra note 2, at 295
(emphasis added). Apparently, this distinction escaped the Fifth Circuit. See
Chatham County Hosp. Auth. v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 325 F. Supp.
614, 617 (D. Ga. 1971) (finding that "annuities are 'essentially a form of invest-
ment' and that the contingency of continuance of life does 'not bring it within
the classification of insurance'") (quoting Wolfe v. Breman, 26 S.E.2d 633, 637
(Ga. 1943)); 3A C.J.S. Annuities § 3 (1973) (noting that "an annuity contract
differs from an insurance contract, and it comprehends few of the elements of
an insurance contract").
116. See Chatham County Hosp. Auth., 325 F. Supp. at 617; APPLEMAN,
supra note 2, at 295; 3A C.J.S. Annuities § 3 (1973); see also SEC v. Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 71 (1959) (concluding that annuities offer a
different form of risk than insurance).
117. See APPLEMAN, supra note 2, at 295 (noting "there is an immediate haz-
ard of loss thrown upon the issuer..."); 3A C.J.S. Annuities § 3 (1973) (stating
that "insurance, as generally understood, is an agreement to indemnify against
loss . . .").
118. See APPLEMAN, supra note 2, at 295 (noting that "the hazard of loss is
no longer upon the company but upon the recipient. .. ").
119. Id. In the case of variable annuities, future income is contingent on the
investment performance of the underlying portfolio. See supra note 79 and ac-
companying text; see also SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. at 71-
72 (referring to variable annuities, the Court stated that "they guarantee noth-
ing to the annuitant except an interest in a portfolio of common stocks or other
equities"). Fixed annuities expose investors to the risk of future payments
made in depreciated dollars. See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359
U.S. at 70; APPLEmAN, supra note 2, at 285. Thus, annuities produce an invest-
ment risk, not an insurance risk. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
120. VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1301.
121. See supra notes 79, 115-119 and accompanying text (discussing general
authority that annuities are not insurance).
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poses. 122 Life insurance distributes proceeds to a designated
beneficiary upon the death of the insured. 123 Conversely, an an-
nuity benefits the purchaser by providing contingent future in-
come. 124  As such, annuities are generally regarded as
investments rather than insurance.1 25
Furthermore, the annuity contracts that the OCC approved
closely resemble other financial investment products that are
not considered insurance. 126 Variable annuity contracts are
functionally equivalent to shares in a mutual fund because pay-
ments to an annuitant depend entirely on the performance of
the investment portfolio.127 Fixed annuity contracts typically
offer a guaranteed return, similar to a certificate of deposit (CD),
and payments for a life term.' 28 Other non-insurance instru-
ments offer life interests in the income of an asset.129 For exam-
ple, banks can sell a CD with a life interest in the income, 30 or
corporate bonds with annuity features, without violating
§ 92.131
122. See Chatham County Hosp. Auth., 325 F. Supp. at 617 (concluding that
"generally speaking, life insurance is a provision for death, while an annuity is
a provision for life") (quoting Wolfe v. Breman, 26 S.E.2d 633, 638 (Ga. 1943));
APPLEAMAN, supra note 2, at 295.
123. See Chatham County Hosp. Auth., 325 F. Supp. at 617.
124. See APPLEmIN, supra note 2, at 285-299. Fixed annuities, introduced in
the 1920s as a method of providing for retirement, became less desirable in-
vestments because of inflation. Id. at 285. Variable annuities allow the offeror
to avoid paying annuitants in depreciated dollars when investment returns ex-
ceed inflation. See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. at 70.
125. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. at 709; see APPLEMAN,
supra note 2, at 285-299. Insurance contemplates payment as a result of loss,
such as loss of life, property, or health. In re New York State Ass'n of Life
Underwriters, Inc. v. New York State Banking Dept., 598 N.Y.S.2d 824, 828
(N.Y. App.Div. 1993) [hereinafter NY Annuity Case]. Annuities contemplate a
long-term income stream based on an initial payment. Id. The 0CC analogized
annuities to several common financial investments in its opinion. See supra
note 79 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
127. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 209-11 (1967); SEC v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. at 70-73; ROBERT POZEN, FINANCIAL
INsTITuTIONS: INVEsTMENT MANAGEMENT 550-55 (1978); see supra note 79 and
accompanying text.
128. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
131. National banks can broker securities without recourse under 12 U.S.C.
§ 24(7). See 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1988). A newly issued corporate bond paying
interest in-kind (PIK) for several years before cash interest and principal be-
comes due resembles a fixed annuity for a fixed term. Similarly, perpetuity
bonds function like fixed annuities. After VALIC, a national bank in the Fifth
Circuit could sell the bonds, but not annuities.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:911
The Fifth Circuit noted that, historically, annuities have
been considered insurance products.1 32 This historical percep-
tion of annuities results because insurance companies typically
issue annuities and all fifty states regulate annuities under
their insurance laws. 133 The court, however, ignored that sev-
eral of these states allow their state-chartered banks to sell an-
nuities.134 Furthermore, federal law distinguishes annuities
from insurance.13 5
Contrary to the Fifth Circuit's conclusion, insurance com-
pany products are not necessarily "insurance." Such a conclu-
sion leads to an inappropriately intransigent classification of
financial products considering today's dynamically changing fi-
nancial markets.1 36 Moreover, assuming that § 92 limits na-
tional bank insurance activities, the plain language applies only
to "soliciting and selling insurance and collecting premiums on
132. VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1300 (quoting the 1990 OCC opinion approving the
sale of fixed annuities by national banks).
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., NY Annuity Case, supra note 125, at 828 (holding that New
York state-chartered banks may sell annuities as a permissible incident to the
business of banking). The New York court concluded that, although the state's
Insurance Law defines "annuity," and the Department of Insurance regulates
annuity sales, an annuity is not insurance. Id. at 828; see also CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 36-142 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993) (permitting state-chartered sav-
ings banks to establish insurance departments); IND. CODE ANN. § 28-1-11-2
(Burns 1993) (permitting state banks to solicit and write insurance as brokers
for insurance companies); MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 178, §§ 1-6 (Law. Co-op.
1987 & Supp. 1993) (permitting state-chartered banks to establish an insurance
department and grant and sell annuities); Banks and Banking-Activities of
State Chartered Banks, 43 Op. Att'y Gen. Mont. 293-95 (1990) (Montana Attor-
ney General opines that state law permits state-chartered banks to directly
market fixed annuities); Retirement Annuities, 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. S.D. 16
(1985) (South Dakota Attorney General opines that state law permits state-
chartered banks to sell retirement annuities); CAPATXDES, supra note 50, at 249
(citing FDIC survey indicating that twenty-four states permit state-chartered
banks or their subsidiaries to engage in general insurance agency and broker-
age activities).
135. See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 395 U.S. at 69-73. The
Supreme Court held that, under federal law, variable annuities are not insur-
ance. Id. at 68-73.
136. The Fifth Circuit failed to recognize the blurring of lines between dif-
ferent segments of the financial services industry. See NYAnnuity Case, supra
note 125; supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (discussing changes in the
commercial banking industry). In the NYAnnuity Case, the court correctly ob-
served that "we should not close our minds to the well-known fact that the
banking business in this country has developed rapidly during the last few
years to meet the ever-growing demands of business. Banks ex necessitate have
been required to extend their functions and perform services formerly foreign to
the banking business." NYAnnuity Case, supra note 125, at 827 (quoting Dyer
v. Broadway Cent. Bank, 169 N.E. 635, 636 (N.Y. 1930)).
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policies." 137 Thus, for § 92 to apply, the court must make a func-
tional finding that annuities are "insurance," not simply insur-
ance company products.
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that annuities are functionally
equivalent to life insurance policies because both use actuarial
calculations to price mortality risk.138 Actuarial calculations of
mortality risk are a common characteristic of annuities and life
insurance, but not the touchstone of what constitutes insurance.
Automobile and property insurance policies set premiums with-
out reference to mortality tables, yet these products are still con-
sidered insurance. Actuarial calculations of mortality risk are a
matter of form, not substance. 139 An annuity lacks the key sub-
stantive element of insurance: indemnification for catastrophic
loss.' 40
A court must defer to a regulatory interpretation unless it is
"arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."14 '
The OCC determined that annuities are not "insurance" under
§ 92 because annuities lack the key element of insurance: in-
demnification for catastrophic loss.342 The OCC substantiated
its decision by further noting that annuities and life insurance
involve different forms of risk.143 Case law as well as prominent
137. 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1988) (omitted since 1952) (emphasis added).
138. VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1301.
139. See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. at 70-73. The
Court noted that issuers of annuities assume mortality risk based on an "actua-
rial prognostication" of life expectancy. Id. at 70. Although mortality risk is an
aspect of insurance, the Court noted that the insurance aspect of annuities cre-
ated by mortality risk is "apparent, not real; superficial, not substantial." Id. at
70-71. The Court's reasoning applies equally to fixed annuities.
Other financial investments reflect assumptions of mortality risk, even if
not actuarially calculated. Investors indirectly account for the risk of an of-
ficer's death (or departure) if the success of the company largely depends on
that officer's management. In this situation, as with annuities, mortality risk
constitutes a component of the investment price. The investment, however,
does not become life insurance simply because mortality risk influenced the
price.
140. See supra notes 79, 116-117, 122-123 and accompanying text (authority
distinguishing annuities from insurance). According to the Supreme Court in
SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., insurance involves a "conventional con-
cept of risk-bearing" that requires an issuer to assume an immediate risk of
loss. 359 U.S. at 70-71. Neither fixed nor variable annuities create this risk for
the issuer.
141. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 844 (1984); see supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text (discussing
Chevron).
142. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing characteristics of
annuities).
143. See id.
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insurance law commentators support the OCC construction. 14 4
As the district court correctly held, Chevron requires deference
to the OCC.145 Oblivious to Chevron, the Fifth Circuit bluntly
responded to the OCC's interpretation: "We disagree." 146 The
Fifth Circuit erred by ignoring the Chevron standard of review
and independently defining annuities.
B. 12 U.S.C. § 92 CREATES No LimiT ON NATIONAL BANK
INSURANCE POWERS
Notwithstanding the classification of annuities, § 92 im-
poses no limit on national bank insurance powers. 147 Although
the Fifth Circuit's analysis of § 92 claims to follow Chevron, the
court treated Chevron disingenuously. The Fifth Circuit implied
Congress's "clear intent" under the expressio unius rule of statu-
tory interpretation 148 and construed Congress's silence in § 92
as a prohibition on national bank insurance powers in cities
with more than 5000 persons.149 Congress, however, can only
express its clear and unambiguous intent when it has "directly
spoken to the precise question at issue."1 50 Thus, courts should
not rely on the expressio unius rule of statutory construction to
144. See supra notes 115-125 and accompanying text (citing cases and sec-
ondary sources distinguishing annuities from insurance).
145. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 786 F. Supp. 639, 642 (S.D.
Tex. 1991), rev'd, 998 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1993).
146. VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1300.
147. Three positions have evolved concerning national bank insurance pow-
ers under § 92. First, § 92 is the full extent of national bank insurance powers.
See American Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that the expressio unius rule leads to the conclusion that Congress intended
to prohibit national banks located and doing business in towns with over 5000
persons from engaging in the insurance agency business); Saxon v. Georgia
Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010, 1014 (5th Cir. 1968) (reasoning that
"since Congress dealt specifically with the insurance agency power in Section
92, the expressio unius [est exclusio alterius] rule negates the existence of any
other power to act as an insurance agent under the general provisions of Sec-
tion 24(7)"). Second, § 92 only restricts national banks from operating general
insurance agencies in cities with more than 5000 persons; § 24(7) authorizes
insurance activities incidental to commercial bank activities. See Independent
Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1169-70 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980); supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Heimann). Third, § 92 creates no limit on national bank insurance powers.
See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 499, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Bank-
ing L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,090 (Feb. 12, 1990); Independent Ins. Agents of Am. v.
Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 736 F.2d 468, 477 n.6 (8th Cir. 1984);
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 786 F.Supp. 639, 642 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
148. See VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1298.
149. See id. at 1300.
150. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (emphasis added).
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determine Congress's intent under the first step of Chevron.' 5 1
The Fifth Circuit asserted that the legislative record sup-
ports the Saxon § 92 construction. 15 2 The legislative record,
however, consists only of Comptroller Williams' 1916 letter to
Congress. 15 3 The letter cannot evidence Congress's intent be-
cause the Comptroller, not Congress, is speaking. Comptroller
Williams' statement that insurance powers "should be limited to
banks in small communities" 154 does not control when the stat-
ute is silent on this point. Had Congress agreed with the Comp-
troller, the statute itself would expressly limit national bank
insurance powers to cities with less than 5000 persons. Further-
more, the Comptroller's letter indicates that the primary pur-
pose of § 92 was to increase the revenue of small town banks
which had difficulty meeting the minimum capital requirements
under federal chartering laws. 15 5 Ironically, giving the Comp-
troller's statements controlling weight over the language Con-
gress used in the statute accomplishes what the Fifth Circuit
seeks to prevent: it allows the Comptroller to contravene
Congress.156
151. Applying the expressio unius rule, a court reaches a conclusion by nega-
tive implication based on the language of the statute. See supra note 61 and
accompanying text (discussing Fifth Circuit application of expressio unius rule).
Chevron, however, holds that those things not "directly spoken to" by Congress
create a delegation of legislative authority to the administrative agency. Chev-
ron, 467 U.S. at 843-44; see supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Chevron). When a court invokes the expressio unius rule, Congress
necessarily has not "directly spoken." Thus, the expressio unius rule directly
conflicts with the first step of Chevron.
152. See VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1298-99.
153. See 53 CONG. REC. 11,001 (1916); see supra note 89 and accompanying
text (discussing the Fifth Circuit's use of Comptroller Williams' letter).
154. 53 CONG. REc. 11,001 (1916).
155. See id.; Independent Ins. Agents of Am. v. Board of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., 736 F.2d 468, 477 n.6 (8th Cir. 1984) (opining that "the legislative
history [of § 921 indicates that Congress was concerned only with providing
small-town banks with an additional profit source, not with prohibiting city
banks from selling insurance"); Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 786
F.Supp. 639, 641 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (opining that "the legislative history of § 92
indicates that it was proposed to provide an additional source of revenue for
national banks located in small towns and not to protect the markets from com-
peting insurance agents"); cf. American Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d
150, 156 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting parts of the Comptroller's letter indicating that
national banks did not have insurance powers before Congress enacted 12
U.S.C. § 92); Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010,
1015 (5th Cir. 1968) (interpreting the Comptroller's letter to mean that national
bank insurance powers are limited to cities with less than 5000 persons).
156. See supra text accompanying note 102 (noting the Fifth Circuit's asser-
tion that national banks should look to Congress, not the OCC, or the courts, for
expanded insurance powers).
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The Fifth Circuit further contended that Chevron does not
entitle the OCC to overrule the judicial precedent established by
Saxon.157 In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,158 the Supreme Court
noted that stare decisis prevents an agency's interpretation from
overriding the Court's construction of a statute.159 The Fifth
Circuit misplaces its reliance on Lechmere because the Supreme
Court has not interpreted the substantive meaning of § 92.160
Furthermore, Saxon is not entitled to precedential weight under
the doctrine of stare decisis.161 The Fifth Circuit decided Saxon
prior to Chevron,162 and subsequently, the Eighth 163 and D.C.
Circuits 6 4 have disagreed with the Saxon construction of § 92.
Section 92, by its plain language, creates no limitation on
national bank insurance powers. 165 An interpretation consis-
tent with the plain language of the statute is not "arbitrary, ca-
pricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute" under the second
step of Chevron.16 6 The OCC construction that § 92 imposes no
157. VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1300 (citing Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct.
841, 847-48 (1992); BPS Guard Services, Inc. v. NLRB, 942 F.2d 519, 523 (8th
Cir. 1991)).
158. 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
159. Id. at 847-48 (citing Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel,
Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759, 2768 (1990)).
160. See supra notes 5, 56 and accompanying text (discussing failure of
Supreme Court to interpret substantive scope of 12 U.S.C. § 92 in United States
Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am.).
161. The Fifth Circuit decided Saxon assuming that a court's interpretation
of a statute may supersede an administrative agency's interpretation. See 399
F.2d. at 1015. In Saxon, the court independently interpreted § 92 without re-
gard to the OCC's construction. Id. Under Chevron, a court cannot reach an
interpretation on its own, or even a better interpretation of the statute. See
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44; supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Chevron). Thus, Saxon does not provide a valid construction of § 92 because
the court did not conform to the standard of judicial review Chevron
established.
162. The Fifth Circuit also relied on BPS Guard Services, Inc. v. NLRB, 942
F.2d 519 (8th Cir. 1991), to support its argument that Chevron does not entitle
an administrative agency to overrule judicial precedent. VALIC, 998 F.2d at
1300. In BPS Guard Services, however, the agency's original interpretation
was reviewed under Chevron. See 942 F.2d at 523-24. Conversely, in Saxon,
the OCC construction of § 92 was not reviewed under Chevron. Thus, Saxon
should not govern the Fifth Circuit's decision or the OCC interpretation.
163. See Independent Ins. Agents of Am. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Re-
serve Sys., 736 F.2d 468, 477 n.6 (8th Cir. 1984).
164. See Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164,
1170 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
165. See supra notes 5, 55 and accompanying text (quoting language of
§ 92).
166. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; see also supra note 38 and accompanying
text (describing Chevron's two-step analysis).
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limit on national bank insurance powers is a permissible con-
struction and warrants deference under Chevron.
C. THE VALIC CONSTRUCTION OF 12 U.S.C. § 92 Is
INCONSISTENT WITH EXISTING NATIONAL BANK
INSURANCE POWERS
The Fifth Circuit erred by relying on Saxon because the
Saxon construction of § 92 conflicts with more recent decisions
concerning national bank insurance powers. Heimann holds
that § 92 does not limit national bank insurance activities inci-
dental to the business of banking.16 7 The Fifth Circuit at-
tempted to reconcile Heimann with the Saxon construction of
§ 92 by implying that credit life insurance may not be "insur-
ance" under § 92 because it amounts to simply charging a higher
price on the underlying loan.168 Credit life insurance, however,
does not differ in form, or substance, from traditional life insur-
ance policies. 169 Credit life insurance provides health, accident,
or life insurance coverage to protect a borrower's debt obligation
in the event of a casualty. I70 Credit life insurance indemnifies
an insured's loss, a principal characteristic of insurance,17 ' and
entails pricing mortality risk, the court's primary reason for
holding that annuities are insurance.' 72 Furthermore, the
167. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (discussing Heimann).
In addition, the Eighth Circuit avoided the Saxon construction of § 92. See
supra note 69 and accompanying text. Furthermore, after Independent Ins.
Agents of Am., Inc. v. Ludwig, § 92 no longer places any practical limitation on
national bank insurance powers. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text
(discussing Ludwig). Although Ludwig provides national banks with the legal
authority to market insurance products into larger cities from a small town
branch, in practice, this is inconvenient and inefficient. See supra notes 75-79
and accompanying text (discussing Ludwig).
168. VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1302. The Fifth Circuit also relied on the Second
Circuit's distinction that credit life insurance only protects the lender's interest.
Id. (citing American Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150, 157 (2d Cir.
1992)). The Second Circuit concluded that title insurance protects the lender's
and the borrower's interest. American Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d at
157.
The Second Circuit is incorrect. Credit life insurance protects the bor-
rower's interest. If the borrower dies, or the prescribed event occurs for which
the insurance applies, credit life insurance protects the borrower from a claim
for repayment of the debt. See Heimann, 613 F.2d at 1168. The Second Cir-
cuit's reasoning, with which the Fifth Circuit agreed in VALIC, unreasonably
contends that borrowers will pay for something that provides no benefit.
169. See Heimann, 613 F.2d at 1168 n.9.
170. See id.
171. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text (discussing character-
istics of insurance).
172. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit's
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
court's rationale that credit life insurance is simply a bank's
method of charging a higher price for the loan fails to recognize
that federal statutory law prohibits "tying arrangements."173
Credit life insurance is "insurance" under § 92. The Fifth
Circuit's construction of § 92 therefore directly conflicts with
Heimann. The court attempted to distinguish Heimann on the
basis that credit life insurance is "intimately related to the
bank's primary business of lending."174 Similarly, selling annui-
ties is "intimately related" to the bank's primary business of of-
fering financial products to customers. The Fifth Circuit,
however, disagreed and stated that "annuities have nothing to
do with the primary business of banking."175 This statement ig-
nores the expansion of commercial bank activities, i.e., the "busi-
ness of banking," that has transpired over the past twenty
years. 176
Notwithstanding the Fifth Circuit's narrow interpretation
of the "business of banking," the court seemingly created an ex-
ception to the Saxon construction of § 92 by stating that banks
may sell insurance products "intimately related to the business
of banking" without violating § 92..77 Earlier in its opinion,
however, the court rejected the OCC's argument that Heimann
limits Saxon to only "broad forms" of insurance.'78 Thus, VALIC
confuses, rather than clarifies, the meaning of § 92.
reasoning for holding that annuities are insurance). The Fifth Circuit did not
address the fact that credit life insurance transfers a direct economic risk of
death to the issuer, whereas an annuity only transfers an indirect risk of death
(i.e., risk of living).
173. See 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1988). A tying occurs when the bank directly or
indirectly forces borrowers to purchase other bank products as a condition for
receiving credit. See LrrAN, supra note 14, at 131. If a national bank required a
borrower to purchase credit life insurance as a condition for receiving a loan,
then the court's argument would have merit. The court ignores, however, that
under federal law, selling the insurance policy must be a distinct transaction
from tendering the loan. See 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1988). Thus, credit life insur-
ance does not constitute charging a higher price on the underlying loan.
174. See VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1302.
175. Id.
176. See NYAnnuity Case, supra note 125, at 828.
Quite plainly, in order to properly interpret the very amorphous
phrase "incidental powers" necessary to carry on the "business of bank-
ing", special expertise is required encompassing a comprehensive un-
derstanding of the evolvement of banking, the nature and extent of
present practices, and the need for and legitimacy of added banking
services in light of present day business technology and customer
needs.
Id.
177. VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1302.
178. Id. at 1301-02.
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D. CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCC CONSTRUCTION OF 12 U.S.C.
§ 92
The OCC construction of § 92 imposes no limitation on na-
tional bank insurance activities. 179 The structural soundness of
the overall U.S. banking system should benefit from allowing
banks to sell insurance. 18 0 Commercial banks can reduce sys-
temic risk through product line diversification.' 8 ' Diversifica-
tion allows an institution to smooth earnings fluctuations from
deposit taking and lending 8 2 and derive cost savings through
economies of scope.' 83
Assuming OCC approval, American consumers could sub-
stantially benefit if commercial banks sold various forms of in-
surance. Commercial banks could become "financial
supermarkets" offering "one-stop" shopping for depository, con-
sumer and commercial credit, capital market, and insurance
products and services.' 84 In addition to convenience, increased
competition in the sale of insurance would result in estimated
cost savings to American consumers of five to seven billiondollars.1185
Permitting national banks to sell insurance does not in-
fringe upon the overriding banking policy objective of maintain-
ing the "safety and soundness" of the banking system.' 8 6
Congress believed that commercial bank securities activities
principally caused the banking crisis of the 1930s, and legisla-
tion targeted securities as the primary area of product line regu-
lation.'8 7 By 1990, however, bank agencies, along with judicial
acquiescence, eliminated many of the Glass-Steagall investment
banking restrictions imposed on commercial banks.' 8 8 Thus,
maintaining the separation between insurance and banking is
179. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing OCC interpreta-
tion of § 92).
180. See LrrAN, supra note 14, at 60-118. This assumes that the OCC ap-
proves a national bank's application to sell insurance under 12 U.S.C. § 24(7).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 104-05.
183. Id. at 74-81.
184. See CAPATIDES, supra note 50, at 244.
185. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (noting benefits associated
with banks' expansion into non-traditional financial products).
186. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (discussing safety and
soundness rationale for regulating the banking industry).
187. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (discussing Depression-
era legislation).




inconsistent with, and inappropriate in light of, the expanded
securities powers of commercial banks.
CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit's decision in VALIC defied the framework
for judicial review established in Chevron. The OCC determined
that 12 U.S.C. § 92 does not apply to the sale of annuities be-
cause annuities are not insurance, and even if they are, § 92
does not impose a limit on national bank insurance activities.
Because Congress did not directly express an intent to limit na-
tional bank insurance activities in § 92, the Fifth Circuit should
have reviewed the OCC opinion under the second step of Chev-
ron. The OCC interpretation that § 92 does not limit national
bank insurance activities accords with the plain language of the
statute and is therefore a permissible construction under
Chevron.
The Fifth Circuit did not need to address the substantive
scope of § 92 in VALIC because annuities are not insurance.
Section 92 does not define insurance which, according to Chev-
ron, creates a delegation of legislative authority to the OCC to
determine which products constitute insurance. Under Chev-
ron, the court should have deferred to the OCC interpretation
that annuities are not insurance. The Fifth Circuit, however,
erroneously ignored Chevron and simply asserted its own opin-
ion that annuities are insurance and within § 92.
The Fifth Circuit's narrow view of permissible bank activi-
ties is particularly inappropriate in light of today's complex fi-
nancial markets. Empirically, commercial banks have suffered
from rigid product line restrictions. As a result, bank regulators
virtually eliminated the Glass-Steagall separation of investment
banking and commercial banking during the 1980s. The Fifth
Circuit's bright line dividing commercial banks and insurance,
without statutory support, is not only ill-advised, but inconsis-
tent with the policy of creating a level playing field for commer-
cial banks.
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